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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Applied An Incorrect Legal Analysis And Reached An
Erroneous Conclusion Regarding Counsel's Tactical Decision To Not Object To
Evidence Of The Witness's Explanation For His Prior Inconsistent Testimony
The District Court Erred By Concluding That The Inadmissibility Of The
Evidence Was Alone Sufficient To Sustain A Finding Of Deficient
Performance Of Counsel

A.

"[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable .... "
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
presumption of competence."

Strickland v.

The court must apply a "strong

Cullen v. Pinholster, _

U.S. _ , 131 S.Ct.

1388, 1407 (2011). To overcome the presumption of competence Cook had to
prove that the strategic decision to not object "resulted from inadequate
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of
objective review."
(2008).

State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136

See also Hinton v. Alabama, _

U.S. _ , 134 S.Ct. 1081, 1088-89

(2014) (counsel's decision to not seek additional expert witness at state expense
deficient because counsel was unaware of law allowing him to do so).
The district court in this case did not find the "strong presumption" of
competence disproved by evidence of "inadequate preparation, ignorance of the
relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective review." Rather, it found
that there is "no strategic reason to allow highly prejudicial evidence to be
admitted if it could be excluded." (R., p. 396.) The district court found deficient
performance exclusively upon its determination that the evidence it deemed
prejudicial could have been excluded, but was not.
1

Because the district court

found deficient performance without finding any objective shortcoming, it applied
an erroneous legal standard and committed reversible error. (Appellant's brief,
pp. 6-8.)
Cook argues the district court "not only set out the appropriate legal
standard, but then concluded 'there is simply no strategic reason to allow highly
inflammatory prejudicial evidence to be admitted if it could be excluded.'"
(Respondent's brief, p. 3.) Cook cannot point out in the record, however, where
the district court ever found an objective shortcoming of counsel, a prerequisite
to concluding that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient.

The

district court simply failed to make any factual finding, such as lack of
preparation or ignorance of the law, that would actually support a conclusion that
counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient.
The court did find that counsel could have objected and successfully
excluded the "inflammatory" and "prejudicial" evidence.
inadequate by itself to show deficient performance.

Such a finding is

See State v. Dunlap, 155

Idaho 345, _,313 P.3d 1,40 (2013) (claimed failure to object to evidence not
deficient performance absent evidence that the lack of objection was "the
product of inadequate preparation or ignorance of the relevant law"). The district
court did not "indulge the strong presumption that counsel made all significant
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Pinholster,
U.S. _ , 131 S.Ct. at 1407 (internal quotes and brackets omitted).

The

standard actually applied by the district court, by which the petitioner may
establish deficient performance merely by showing inadmissible evidence came
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in at his trial, employed no presumption, required no proof of objective
deficiency, and effectively required the state to prove that counsel was not
deficient.

Cook's argument that a showing of inadmissibility is sufficient to

sustain his burden of proof is simply contrary to law.

B.

The District Court Erred By Failing To Consider Counsel's Stated
Reasons For Not Objecting
Defense counsel's stated reason for not objecting was because the

evidence of the threats was "part and parcel of Mr. Nelson's testimony or
contention." (Trial Tr., p. 108, Ls. 13-16.) The district court considered whether
the evidence would be admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt, but
failed to consider counsel's stated reason for not objecting. (R., p. 395.) The
testimony regarding the threats was admissible to demonstrate the reasons for
the witness's inconsistent statement at the preliminary hearing; therefore
defense

counsel

reasonably

concluded

the

evidence

was

admissible.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 11-12.)
Cook's response is that trial counsel "stated he believed that the threat
evidence was admissible as part and parcel of a confession." (Respondent's
brief, p. 5.)

This representation is inaccurate.

Counsel stated he was not

objecting because testimony regarding the alleged threats was "part and parcel
of Mr. Nelson's testimony or contention."

(Trial Tr., p. 108, Ls. 8-15.)

He

specifically stated, in response to whether there should be a limiting instruction,
"I don't see that it's part of an alleged confession." (Trial Tr., p. 108, Ls. 15-16
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(emphasis added).) 1

Trial counsel specifically denied that the evidence of

threats was "part and parcel" of any confession; the record clearly establishes
that the evidence of threats was "part and parcel" of the witness's prior
inconsistent testimony at the preliminary hearing.

The law would not have

allowed trial counsel to simultaneously impeach the witness with evidence of his
prior inconsistent statements and deny the witness the opportunity to explain the
inconsistency.

Openshaw v. Adams, 92 Idaho 488, 492, 445 P.2d 663, 667

(1968) ("It is settled that upon introduction of evidence which seemingly
impeaches or contradicts a witness's testimony, the witness must be permitted a
reasonable

opportunity to

explain

the

impeaching

evidence.")

(cited

at

Appellant's brief, p. 11).
In this case trial counsel elected to put the evidence (inconsistent
statements and explanation that inconsistent statements were the result of
threats) because he believed that the jury would ultimately conclude the witness
was not credible. (Trial Tr., p. 108, Ls. 4-16.) Because keeping out the threat
evidence would likely also have resulted in the exclusion of the inconsistent
statement evidence, the election to put both before the jury instead of neither

Cook is conflating trial counsel's statements in relation to two different parts of
the evidence. Counsel did state that evidence of Cook's threats that he would
harm the victim to prevent her from testifying was "an admission type statement."
(Trial Tr., p., 114, Ls. 13-18 (cited at Respondent's brief, p. 5).) The district court
found deficient performance for failing to object to evidence that "Cook
threatened to rape Nelson's wife and daughter and that his family would be
'taken care of' if he testified." (R., p. 295.) The district court did not address any
failure to object to evidence of threats to harm the victim. (R., pp. 392-401.)
Because the district court did not base any finding of deficient performance on
any lack of objection to evidence of threats against the victim, such is beyond the
scope of this appeal.
1

4

was a quintessential tactical decision. The court's conclusion that just because
the evidence could have been excluded an objection must have been made is
contrary to law.

C.

The District Court Erred In Its Prejudice Analysis
The district court erred in two ways. First, by failing to recognize that the

evidence of threats was relevant to explain the prior inconsistent statement it
erred because the evidence was admissible on this ground or, alternatively,
exclusion of the evidence of the explanation for the inconsistent statement would
have resulted in exclusion of the inconsistent statements as well. (Appellant's
brief, pp. 11-12.) Second, the district court's analysis focused on whether the
jury would have "ignored" the evidence instead of whether, considering the trial
as a whole, there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient
performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. (Appellant's
brief, pp. 12-13.) Because the district court failed to address the proper legal
standards for admission of the challenged evidence and because it ultimately
applied an incorrect prejudice analysis it erred and must be reversed.
In response Cook adopts the district court's opinion and claims the "State
failed to show the district court erred." (Respondent's brief, p. 6.) Application of
the correct standards of admissibility of evidence, however, shows that the
evidence of threats was admissible to explain the inconsistent testimony offered
at the preliminary hearing, and that if the evidence had been excluded such
would have foreclosed impeachment with the prior inconsistent testimony.
Neither of these results was prejudicial to Cook. Likewise, the court's rationale is

5

flawed because the jury would not have "ignored" the testimony regarding the
threats only if they found it credible, and if they found the witness' testimony
credible they likely would have convicted anyway.

The district court applied

incorrect legal theories and reached an erroneous result.

II.
The District Court Applied An Incorrect Legal Analysis And Reached An
Erroneous Conclusion Regarding Counsel's Tactical Decision In Relation To
Evidence Of The Victim's Disclosure Of The Rape
The record establishes that trial counsel affirmatively used evidence of the
victim's disclosure to argue that the timing of the disclosure evinced fabrication
and unreliability.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 14-15.)

Once again the district court

erroneously concluded that a determination that the evidence was subject to
objection established both prongs of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 15-19.) Cook has chosen to not respond to the state's
argument. (See, generally, Respondent's brief.) For the reasons stated in the
Appellant's brief, the district court erred.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's
order and judgment granting post-conviction relief.
DATED this 22nd day of April, 20~.
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